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Commencing with this issue, there will be several changes in the Washing-
ton Law Review.
Hereafter, the State Bar Association material will appear only m the
November issue, which will be devoted primarily to the Association.
The months of publication are changed to February, May, August and
November, in order to facilitate the work of the Student Editorial Board.
At considerable expense, the general format of the Law Review is being
changed so that it will be more attractive in appearance and more readable.
We hope that this change will meet with your approval.-EDTOR.
COMMENT
ADMINISTRATION OF PARTNERSHIP ESTATES IN WASHING-
TON: PROBATE CODE V UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
JoHN MCSXERRY, JR.
Were a contest to arise today in Washington between a surviving partner
and the -administrator or executor of his deceased partner's estate, as, to
which has the right to administer the partnership estate (assuming the
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surviving partner has not complied with the requirements of the Probate
Code'), each contestant could invoke statutes which apparently support his
claim and exclude the other's. The administrator would turn to the Probate
Code; the surviving partner, to the Uniform Partnership Act. Our court
would then be faced with the task of deciding which should control.
I.
Following are the provisions of the Washington Probate Code which deal
with administration of partnership estates and uphold the administrator.-
contention.
2
REm. Ray. STAT. § 1458: The executor or administrator of the estate of a
deceased person who was a member of a co-partnership, shall include in the
inventory, in a separate schedule, the whole of the property of such co-partner-
ship; and the appraisers shall estimate the value thereof and also the value of
such deceased person's individual interest in the partnership property.
The whole of the partnership property shall be administered by such executor
or administrator, unless the surviving partner shall within five days from the
filing of the inventory, or such further time as the court may allow, apply for
the administration thereof. If he so apply, he shall be entitled to administer the
partnership property if the court find him to be qualified. If letters of admin-
istration be issued to such partner, he shall give such bond as the court may
require. He shall be denominated the administrator of the partnership and shall
give notice to the partnership creditors as general administrators are required
to give and shall settle the partnership estate in the same manner as is or shall
be provided for the settlement of estates of deceased persons except he shall
account to the general executor or administrator for the interest of the deceased
in the partnership property.
REmVi. REV. STAT. § 1460: The court shall have authority, in instances where it
is deemed advisable, to authorize the administrator of the partnership property
to continue to operate any going business pending the settlement of the partner-
ship estate or the purchase by the surviving partner of the interest of the
deceased partner.
Rm. REv. STAT. § 1461: In case the surving partner is not appointed admin-
istrator of the partnership property, the administration thereof shall devolve
upon the executor or adminstrator and the court shall have power to require
the surviving partner to deliver the partnership property and evidences thereof
to the administrator or executor.
II.
The following provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, as adopted by
Washington,$ expressly or impliedly confer upon the surviving partner an
almost unqualified authority to wind up the partnership affairs:
'See REM REv. STAT. § 1458 nfra.
2 Wash. Laws 1917, c. 158, H§ 88, 90, 91. Comment (1925) 1 WAsH L. REv. 57.
'Wash. Laws 1945, c. 137.
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Section 31. Dissolution is caused: (4) By the death of any partner.'
Section 37. UnleSs otherwise agreed the partners who have not wrongfully
dissolved the partnership or the legal representative of the last surviving part-
ner, not bankrupt, has the right to wind up the partnership affairs: Prorvded,
however, That any partner, his legal representative or is assignee, upon cause
shown, may obtain winding up by the court.5
Section 33. Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs
or to complete transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates
all authority of any partner to act for the partnership a,
Section 35. (1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnersup
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing
transactions unfinished at dissolution;
Section 25. (2) (d) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership
property vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased
was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in his
legal representative. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal represen-
tative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the partnership
property for any but a partnership purpose.8
Section 42. When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued
under any of the conditions set forth in section 41 (1, 2, 3, 5, 6), or section
38 (2b), without any settlement of accounts as between him or Ins estate, and
the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he
or his legal representative as against such persons or partnership may have the
value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as
an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dis-
solved partnership with interest, or, at us option or at the option of Is legal
representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of Is right in
the property of the dissolved partnersup: Provided, That the creditors of the
dissolved partnership as against the separate creditors, or the representative of
the retired or deceased partner, shall have priority on any claim arising under
this section as provided by section "41 (8) of this actY
Section 38. (1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contra-
vention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners
and all persons claiming through them in respect of their interests an, the part-
nership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied
to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount
owing to the respective partners. .211
Section 43. The right to an, account of his interest shall accure to any partner,
or us legal representative, as against the winding up partners or the surviving
partners or the person -or partnership continuing the business, at the date of
dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.il
' Rnm. REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 9975-70.
5Id. 1 9975-78.
4IL § 9975-72:
Ir, § 9975-74.
'Id. § 9975-64.
91d. § 9975-81.
20 d. § 9975-77.
2" RL § 9975-82.
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III.
The earlier probate provisions seem obviously inconsistent with the later
provisions of the Partnership Act: Under the Probate Code the adminis-
trator of the deceased partner's estate shall include in his inventory the
whole partnership property, and an appraiser shall determine the deceased
partner's interest therein; 1 2 while under the Partnership Act the deceased
partner's estate has an interest only in the surplus remaining after the part-
nership debts are paid and the partnership affairs wound up 3-- indeed, by
the act, title to the partnership property vests in the surviving partner, who
can use it only to wind up the partnership affairs1 4 or carry on its business
with the consent of the administrator of the deceased partner's estate.1 The
latter, under the Probate Code, shall administer the whole partnership
property unless the surviving partner apply within 5 days after the admin-
istrator files his inventory;1 6 and the surviving partner's application will be
allowed only if he meets the qualifications of an administrator, such as resi-
dence and giving of bond.17 Further, the acts of a surviving partner under
the Probate Code are subject to the supervision of the probate court and to
the procedures required by the Probate Code in the administration of estates.
The Partnership Act, however, gives the surviving partner an almost un-
qualified right to wind up the partnership affairs. It contains, for example, no
suggestion that non-residence will disqualify the surviving partner. It requires
no bond or other form of security It does not provide for court supervision
except to permit the legal representative "upon cause shown" to seek and
obtain winding up by the court.' This particular provision of the Partnership
Act in and of itself clearly shows that court supervision of the winding up
process is reserved for exceptional cases and doubtless refers to supervision
by a general court of equity rather than the probate court acting under
the Probate Code.
Taken collectively, the various inconsistencies illustrate the conflict between
the earlier and later statutory provisions. They seem irreconcilable. As such,
2 2 Rmw_. REv. STAT. § 1458.
23 RE1I. REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) §§ 9975-77, -81. Note (1930) 9 Nm. L. BULL. 211.
"I REm. REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 9975-64.
25 Id. § 9975-80. Accord: Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 At. 276 (1925), noted
(1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 512. That such consent will be assumed by the court
where the business is continued by the survivmg partner, New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Hageman, 80 F (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935)
10 Rwvi. REV. STAT. § 1458.
1 Id. §§ 1457, 1458.
18 Id. (1945 Supp.) § 9975-76.
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it would appear that the earlier probate statutes have been impliedly re-
pealed by the Partnership Act. Let us consider the question of implied repeal.
IV
The Uniform Partnership Act states that it "shall be so interpreted and
construed as to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.1119 Adoption of the spirit as well as the letter of the
Act would seem to require deference to this avowed purpose to secure uniform-
ity of law. Only by modifying prior laws to conform to the Act can its pur-
pose be effected.
The Act provides that "all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act
are hereby repealed."120 This does not, however, constitute a direct repeal
of conflicting acts; 2' such repeal must be worked, if at all, by implication.
Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored in the law, and a later
act does not so repeal an earlier one unless (f) the later act embraces the
entire subject matter of the earlier legislation, is complete in itself, and
evidences an intent to supersede the prior enactment, or (2) the two enact-
ments are so dearly inconsistent and repugnant that they cannot, by fair
and reasonable construction, be reconciled and both given effect. 22
It is the policy of our court that where different statutes embody provisions
relating to the same subject-matter, they should be harmonized so as to
maintain the integrity of both, whenever possible. 8 There will be no repeal
by implication unless from the later act can be gathered a legislative intent
to repeal the earlier act.24 The Partnership Act is comprehensive in scope;
but this, by itself, does not manifest a legislative intent that the Act be
exclusive or supersede prior legislation.2 5 In seeking to find this legislative
intent, one might argue that the legislature overlooked the prior legislation,
and that subsequent passage of an apparently inconsistent enactment in itself
betokens a legislative intent to supersede the earlier statute which had been
1* Id. § 9975-43.
20 Wash. Laws. 1945, c. 137, § 44; P. P. C. (1945 Supp.) § .768-11; this statute is
referred to in an editor's note to REiL REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 9975-40.
31 State v. Cross, 22 Wn. (2d) 402, 156 P. (2d) 416 (1945)
2 Abel v. Diking and Drainage Imp. Dist 'No. 4 of Grays Harbor County, 19
Wn.(2d) 356, 142 P.(2d) 1017 (1943); O'Neil v. Crampton, 18 Wn.(2d) 579, 140
P.(2d) 308 (1943).
2'State v. Cross, 22 Wn.(2d) 402, 156 P.(2d) 416 (1945); In re Sanford, 10
Wn. (2d) 686, 118 P. (2d) 179 (1941); certiorari denied, Sanford v. Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles of State of Washington, 315 U. S. 820, 86 L. ed. 1217, 62 Sup. Ct.
917 (1942); Buell v. McGee, 9 Wn. (2d) 84, 113 P. (2d) 522 (1941)
21 State ex reL Shepard v. Super. Court, 60 Wash. 370, 111 Pac. 233, 140 Am.
St. Rep. 925 (1910)
26In re Sanford, supra note 21.
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overlooked. But this position is difficult to maintain in view of the ruling
that, in legislating upon a subject, the legislature is presumed to be familiar
not only with the previous legislation relating thereto, but also with the court
decisions, if any, construing such former enactments."8 Yet the court has
also adopted the view that
"An intention will not be ascribed to the lawmaking power to establish
conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force pro-
visions of law by which the later will of the legislature may be thwarted and
overthrown."27
Our court has ruled that where a later enactment deprived port commis-
sioners of a part of their power to fix rates which had been granted them
by an earlier act, the two acts were irreconcilable. -8 III another situation the
court declared:
"It thus appears that, in the act of 1917, the public service coinussion is
given the power to fix the prices of the service outside of the city, and in the
act of 1933, the city is given the power to fix the rates for the service. The price
of the service and the rates for the service must necessarily mean the same
thing. Both are the measure of compensation which the city shall receive. It
follows that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, and the
later act, that of 1933, prevails."29
From these decisions it appears that the later Partnership Act is irrecon-
cilable with and therefore impliedly repeals the earlier probate provisions;
for, as was pointed out supra, the Partnership Act grants wide powers of
administration to the surviving partner, while the earlier provisions, if given
effect, would substantially derogate from those powers.
Only one case treating of this identical question has been brought to the
writer's attention. Since it seems to contradict directly the conclusion herein,
it merits analysis.
V
Alaska adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 191780 without expressly
repealing earlier probate provisions 8' almost identical in substance to the
96 In re Levy, 23 Wn, (2d) 607, 161 P (2d) 651 (1945)
'9 Quoted with approval from 1 LEwis' SU33ERLAND STATUTOaY CONSRUCTxON
(2d ed.) 473, § 249 in State ex rel. Johnston v. Gregory, 191 Wash. 691, 695, 72
P (2d) 308 (1937)
28 State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Dept. P S., 1 Wn. (2d) 102, 95 P. (2d) 1007
(1939)
29 State ex rel. West Side Imp. Club v. Dept. P S., 186 Wash. 378, 383, 58 P (2d)
350 (1936)
80Laws Alaska 1917, c. 69; Comp. LAws ALASKA 1933, §§ 2729 to 2800.
81 Com~p. LAws ALASA 1913, §§ 1622 to 1628, now Coass'. LAWS ALASKA 1933,
§ 4378 to 4384.
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Washington probate provisions discussed supra. Dams v. Hutchnswn8
raised the question whether, under- the Alaska laws, a surviving partner had
authority to administer the partnership affairs as survivor for purpose of
winding up the partnership, without previous court authorization. Three
judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals heard this case. The decision opens
with the opimon of Judge Wilbur, which consumes nearly five pages. In this
opimon the point is made that repeals by implication are not generally
favored and that the effect of this rule is reinforced by the further fact that
the power of the Alaska legislature to repeal the probate code provisions
was gravely in doubt. The territorial legislature of Alaska is limited in its
authority by the act of Congress from which the legislature secures its
authority, and which provides that
"All the laws of the United States heretofore passed establishing the executive
and judicial departments in Alaska shall continue in full force and effect until
amended or repealed by Act of Congress; "183
In this state of affairs, Judge Wilbur rested his decision on the circumstance
that the acts of the surviving partner which were called into question occurred
before any probate proceedings in the estate of the deceased partner had
been initiated, and held that during this period, at least, no essential incon-
sistency existed between the two acts. He thus took the position that the
right of the surviving partner to wind up the affairs of the -firm under the
Uniform Partnership Act exists by virtue of that act at least until a personal
representative has been named in probate and has filed an inventory. By
this deft ratiocination Judge Wilbur avoided deciding the ultimate problem
of implied repeal:
"We have not specifically dealt with the question as to whether or not the
assets of partnership after the taking out of letters of administration by the
surviving partner must be administered in accordance with the general law
affecting probate under the Compiled Laws of Alaska, or whether under such
circumstances the surviving partner has complete discretion to deal with the
affairs of the partnership subject only to the duty of applying the assets to the
indebtedness.and turning over to the representatives of the deceased partner his
proportion of the balance. We need not decide ths question %n hts case. It ts
manifest that there is a conflict between the Uniform Partnership Law, whwh
gves the surviving partner complete and entire discretion to w nd up the affairs
of the partnership, and the Compiled-Laws of Alaska, whzoh subordinate that
discretion to the probate law and to the 3udgment of the probate court sn case
the admtntstrator of the deceased partner %nventores the partnershtp property
as an asset of hts estate; "i' (Italics added.)
3236 F.(2d) 309 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929)
3 37 STAT. 512, § 3, 48 U. S. C. A. § 23.
3' Davis v. Hutchinson, 36 F. (2d) 309, 314 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929)
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The most remarkable aspect of the case lies in the fact that the majority
view as to the basis for the decision is expressed in the concurring opinion."
Two of the three judges sitting on the court-Judges Dietrich and Louderback
-concurred mn the result as follows:
"I think that the Uniform Partnership Law irreconcilably conflicts with the
Compiled Statutes of Alaska. Each is complete in itself, and exclusive respecting
the management or administration of partnership property upon the death of
one of the partners. If, therefore, the Uniform Partnership Act is valid, it
necessarily operates to repeal the Compiled Statutes pro tanto. -as
Thus the court in fact ruled there had been a repeal by implication, but,
by the manner of rendition, avoided the complications arising from such a
holding.
Since the Washington legislature unquestionably has the power to repeal
or alter the provisions of the Probate Code, the courts of this state would
not be faced by the peculiar considerations presented to the Circuit Court
of Appeals in Davs v. Hutchinson, where the power of the Alaska legislature
to repeal the earlier act was doubtful.
VI.
It is submitted that Washington could benefit from the example set by
Oregon-an example which demonstrates that the most satisfactory solution
to this problem lies with the legislature, not the courts.
Oregon adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 193937 without repealing
earlier probate statutes" almost identical in substance to the Washington
probate statutes herein discussed. In the editor's notes to each of these Oregon
probate statutes he observed that the statute was possibly repealed by
implication by the Uniform Partnership Act. The undesirability of this
incertitude in the law was recognized in Oregon, and express repeal of the
Probate Code sections followed to end the confusion:
"If no careful check is made of the statutes upon the enactment of new
legislation, inconsistencies are bound to arise. Just when a statute conflicts
with another statute is not always easy to determine. But, if there is any doubt
whatsoever, all statutes involved should be redrafted; lawsuits arise out. of the
doubtful cases as well as out of the cases of clear conflict. If the statutes are
in conflict, the problem of implied repeal is presented-a problem which could
be avoided by proper revision at the time the new statute is enacted.
10 Appreciative acknowledgment is made to Prof. J. Gordon Gose of the
University of Washington Law School faculty, who pointed out this odd feature
of the case.
8e Davis v. Hutchinson, 36 F (2d) 309, 314 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929)
17 Ore. Laws 1939, c. 550, 0. C. L. A. §§ 79-101 to 79-615.
380. C. L. A. § 19-50 to 19-507.
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'"The code commissioner has been. successful in obtaining the removal of a
few of the conflicting provisions in the Oregon code. The glanng conflict between
the Unijorm Partnershtp Act and the prortons of Chapter 5, pertainzng to the
aom nistration of partnershtp estates, was finally removed in the 1943 session of
the legislature by the repeal of the conflicting provisions in Chapter 5.89 The
code commissioner's first attempt in 1941 to resolve the conflict had failed when
the repealer bill died in the Revision of Laws Committee of the Senate.""°
(Italics added)
Although the Uniform Partnership Act is broad in scope, the Oregon
legislature did not believe that its provisions were sufficiently complete to
delineate and regulate satisfactorily the surviving partner's powers in winding
up the partnership affairs. Hence, when repealing the conflicting provisions
of the Probate Code, the legislature substituted therefor the following pro-
visions to supplement the Partnership Act: 4"
Section 1. Within 30 days after the death of a partner the surviving partner
shall file a verified inventory of the assets of the partnership in the probate
court in which letters testamentary or of administration are issued on the estate
of the decedent or, if not letters are issued, in the probate court of the county
of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death. The inventory shall
state the value of the assets as shown by the books of the partnership and a list
of the liabilities of the partnership. If letters testamentary or of administration
have issued on the estate of the decedent, the surviving partner shall cause the
assets of the partnership to be appraised in like manner as the individual property
of a deceased person, which appraisal shall include the value of the assets of
the partnership and a list of the liabilities. The appraisers appointed by the
court to appraise the separate property of the deceased partner shall appraise
the partnership property, and the surviving partner shall fle the inventory
and appraisal with the court in which the estate of the deceased partner is
being administered.
Section 2. The surviving partner may continue in possession of the partner-
ship estate, pay Its debts, and settle its business, and- shall account to the
executor or the administrator of the decedent and shall pay over such balances
as may, from time to time, be payable to him. Upon the verified petition of the
executor or adminitrator, or on its own motion, the probate court, whenever it
appears necessary, may order the surviving partner to account to said court.
Section 3. If the surviving partner commits waste, or if it appears to the
probate court that it is for the best interest of the estate of the decedent, such
court may order the surviving partner to give security for the faithful settlement
8 The author's footnote states: "Secs. 19-501 to 19-507 of the Probate Code
provided for the administration of partnership estates. The Uniform Partnership
Act. (Secs. 79-101 to 79-615) provided an entirely different method of admin-
istering such estates. Sees. 19-501 to 19-507 were repealed by Ore. Laws 1943,
c. 42G."
dO O'Connell, Need for Statutory Revisum in Oregon (1944) 23 ORE. L. Rv.
93, 107.
'
1 Ore. Laws 1943, c. 426. Cf ILL. PaosaTE Cons, c. 3, §§ 340 to 343; note
(1940) 1. B. 3. 24; In re Monahan's Estate, 319 Ill. App. 247, 48 N. E. (2d) 725
(1943)
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of the partnership affairs and the payment to the executor or administrator of
any amount due the estate.
Section 4. If the surviving partner fails or refuses to file the inventory, list
of liabilities or appraisal, or if it appears proper to order the surviving partner
to account to the probate court or to file a bond, said court shall order a citation
to issue requiring the surviving partner to appear and show cause why he has
not filed an mventory, list of liabilities or appraisal or why he should not
account to the court or file a bond. The citation shall be served not less than
ten days before the return day designated theren. If the surviving partner
neglects or refuses to file an inventory, list of liabilities or appraisal, or falls
to account to the court or to file a bond, after he has been directed to do so,
he may be punished for a contempt or the court may commit him to jail until
he complies with the order of the court. Where the surviving partner fails to
file a bond after being ordered to do so by the court, the court may also appoint
a receiver of the partnership estate with like powers and duties of receivers
in equity, and order the costs and expenses of the proceedings to be paid out
of the partnership estate or out of the estate of the decedent, or by the surviving
partner personally, or partly by each of the parties.
This supplementary act augments the Partnership Act and at the same
time appears to harmonize with the spirit and substance of the latter's pro-
visions. It might well serve as a prototype for our Washington legislature,
should that body repeal our earlier statutes42 regarding the administration
of partnership estates.
VII.
In summary- Our Probate Code provisions with regard to winding up
partnership estates obviously conflict with the provisions of the Uniform
Partnership Act dealing with the same subject. In view of the general policy
of the law which opposes repeals by implication, it is, of course, impossible
to state with absolute certainty that the supreme court of this state will hold
that such a repeal has been worked by the Partnership Act. Nevertheless,
when all of the factors are considered, the two acts appear to be so funda-
mentally irreconcilable as to call for a holding of repeal by implication when
the question is submitted to the court.
The most satisfactory solution to the problem would spring from legis-
lative enactment, however, rather than judicial construction.
13A survey of statutes of our various states and Alaska revealed that, since
the Oregon action described, only Washington and Alaska now have statutes of
this particular type along with the Uniform Partnership Act. Alaska probably
still retains these early probate statutes for the reason stated in section V of this
comment, as explaining the decision in Davis v. Hutchmson--.e., the limitation
on the power of the territorial legislature.
